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1 Introduction
Economics traditionally takes individualsmotivations their preferences as xed and given.
Hence, the predictive power of economics depends to a large extent on the assumptions made
regarding these motivations. Since the development of general equilibrium models in the
1950s, consumers are assumed to have xed and given preferences over the consumption
alternatives they face, preferences that do not depend on other consumersor producers
choices or preferences. Likewise, producers have their expected prots as their sole motiva-
tion, and, when economists look inside rms, managers are assumed to only care about their
own monetary outcome. Such assumptions separate individual economic agents from each
other in a way that allows for clear-cut and powerful analyses of a wide range of economic
issues, both under perfect and imperfect competition, and with or without externalities. The
same is true in non-cooperative game theory when each players payo¤ function traditionally
is taken to depend only on the players own material outcome. However, even slight devi-
ations from standard assumptions may have signicant consequences for predictions. For
example, individuals who care about fairness may refuse unfair pay increases, competitive
individuals may engage in ine¢ cient rat races, morally motivated consumers may prefer ex-
pensive greenproducts to brownproducts that give them the same consumption utility.
And any standard economics model, say an exchange economy under perfect competition,
implicitly relies on trust in other individuals, in institutions, in the issuer of at money
which is not part of the model.
By contrast to these models, work by economists in earlier times sometimes included
reections on motivations other than material self interest (e.g., Smith, 1759, Edgeworth,
1881, Veblen, 1899). Moreover, there is now ample empirical evidence in the economics
literature based both on experiments in laboratories and in the eld that people do not
behave in line with pure material self-interest. For instance, individuals sometimes refuse
unfair o¤ers, or honor trust, even at a cost to themselves, and they sometimes make fair o¤ers
at a monetary cost to themselves, and trust strangers, even at a risk of losing money. Such
fair o¤ers and trust may be motivated by non-materialistic dispositions such as a concern
for fairness, altruism, or morality, for instance, but it may also be driven by pure material
self-interest if the decision-maker believes that the other party has such a disposition. In any
event, some deviation from the assumption of material self-interest is called for in order to
explain observed behaviors. Of course, one may question the external validity of the empirical
results. Maybe all or most individuals would learnto maximize material self-interest over
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time. But this presumes that material self-interest has a long-run survival value over and
beyond all forms of other-regarding preferences. Is this presumption generally valid? If not,
what other motivational factors may increase the survival value? These are the basic question
addressed in the literature on the evolutionary foundations of preferences, a literature we
here discuss.
Foundational questions concerning pure self-interest and prot maximization were raised
already by Alchian (1950) and Friedman (1953). A few decades later, the literature on
the evolutionary foundations of other-regarding preferences took o¤. Important pioneering
contributions were Becker (1976), Hirshleifer (1977, 1978), Frank (1987), Güth and Yaari
(1992), to mention a few. Particularly inuential for the subsequent formal modelling of
preference evolution was the paper by Güth and Yaari. They proposed what was to become
called the indirect evolutionary approach: Instead of assuming that individual preferences
are exogenously given, we think of an evolutionary process where preferences are determined
as evolutionarily stable.(op.cit.) They illustrated this approach by means of a simple two-
player game in which players knew each otherspreferences, and where reciprocity became
evolutionarily stable (see also Frank, 1987). It was in Güth and Kliemt (1998) that the name
of the approach was coined, and in this paper the authors showed that trustworthiness, if
observable, may be evolutionarily stable. In a sense, these ndings conrmed Schellings
(1960) observation about the potential strategic advantage of commitment.
The current literature on preference evolution is vast and methodologically diverse. In-
stead of trying to cover the whole literature, we extract a few main lessons learned so far.
The survey is organized around one question: Does or does not evolution favor pure self-
interest as the sole motivation? More precisely, in what context does evolution lead to Homo
oeconomicus, dened as rational and purely-self interested behavior, and in what contexts
does it not? Research results providing a¢ rmative answers to the rst question are pre-
sented in Sections 3, while research providing a¢ rmative answers to the second question are
discussed in Section 4, where we also discuss what other motivations are then favored by
evolution. We summarize the answers in these two sections in the form of eleven informally
stated observations, major lessonsthat we draw from existing work. However, in order to
present and discuss the relevant background research, we rst, in Section 2, set up a general
model framework encompassing most of the existing models. We conclude in Section 5 by
way of discussing shortcomings and lacunas in the existing literature, and by suggesting a
few potentially promising directions for future work.
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2 Model framework and preliminaries
Much of the literature can be discussed within the following theoretical framework. Consider
a population in which individuals are now and then matched into groups of xed size n to play
a symmetric material game   = hn;X; i, where X is the set of (pure or mixed) strategies,
the same for all players, and  (xi;x i) 2 R is the material payo¤ from using strategy
xi 2 X against x i, the strategy prole of all other individuals in the group. The following
assumptions will be maintained throughout, unless stated otherwise: (a) the strategy set X
is a non-empty and compact set in a normed vector space, (b) the material payo¤ function
 : Xn ! R is continuous and aggregative in the sense that the material payo¤  (xi;x i)
is invariant under permutation of the components of x i, the strategies used by the other
players in is group. In the special case of nite games, we will follow the practice in game
theory and let the strategy set X be the unit simplex  (S) of mixed strategies, where S is
the nite set of pure strategies available to each player role. The material payo¤ function 
is then linear in the players own mixed strategy (given the other playersstrategies).
Examples of strategic interactions covered by this model include (a) public goods games
between identical individuals where the amount of the public good is a symmetric function
of their contributions (for example the sum), (b) contests between identical contestants, (c)
symmetric coordination games, etc. These games may be one-shot, multi-stage, or repeated.
Importantly, while the material game has to be symmetric, it encompasses ex post asymmet-
ric interactions as long as all participants are ex ante equally likely to be in any given player
role. For instance, an ultimatum bargaining game in which the ip of a fair coin determines
who is the proposer is ex post asymmetric but ex ante symmetric. The same is true for an
n-player "team-leadership" game in which each player is equally likely to be the team leader,
with the others as ordinary team members. Likewise if information, or some other relevant
characteristic such as skill, is ex post asymmetric but ex ante symmetric. In such ex ante
symmetric, but ex post asymmetric interactions, a participants strategy is conditioned on
the player role, information or characteristic given.
There is also a type space  upon which we will let evolution operate. Each individual in
the population is of some such type  2 , which may be known or unknown by others. We
will restrict attention to population states in which the type distribution  has nite support,
that is, where there are only nitely many types  2  present (with  () > 0). More
importantly, we will focus on only two extreme cases concerning individuals information
about each otherstypes: complete information, when all individuals in each group know
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and hence can condition their behavior on the types of all members, that is, their groups
type prole  = (1; :::; n) 2 n. In the other extreme case, which we refer to as incomplete
information, each individuals type is her private information. Types are inherited from one
generation to the next, and the question is which types will prevail in the long run, when
evolutionary forces are at work. If types are genetically determined, evolution by natural
selection is driven by tness, which essentially is the ability to survive and/or produce viable
o¤spring. If types are culturally determined, it is the ability to produce cultural o¤spring
which determines evolutionary success. In general, tness is not modeled explicitly in the
economics literature, however. Instead, the material payo¤ function  is taken to represent
tnessor evolutionary success.
The indirect evolutionary approach builds on classic evolutionary game theory, in which
the type space is the set of (pure or mixed) strategies in the material game,  = X, i.e.,
individuals are programmed to play a specic strategy (for a textbook treatment, see
Weibull, 1995). We will refer to this case as strategy evolution. In the literature on preference
evolution, the types are instead utility functions f : Xn ! R over strategy proles (xi;x i) 2
Xn. Each individual is assumed to strive to maximize the expected value of his or her
utility function. In game-theoretic terminology, an individuals utility function is thus his
or her (subjective) payo¤ function when matched to play the material-payo¤ game with
other individuals. Focus will here be on the set F of continuous and aggregative utility
functions f : Xn ! R. This set contains the material-payo¤ function . Obviously, any
strictly increasing transformation of any utility function f represents the same preferences
over strategy proles. Hence, by a type f we mean the whole (equivalence) class [f ] of
utility functions in F that represent the same preferences. Individuals with preferences in
[] will be called Homo oeconomicus.
While individuals of the same type, so dened, have the same set of best replies to every
strategy prole, we will also need to keep track of types whose best-reply sets happen to
overlap for some strategy proles. LetXf  X denote the set of symmetric Nash equilibrium
strategies when all players are of the same type f 2 F :
x^ 2 arg max
x2X
f
 
x; x^(n 1)

; (1)
where x^(n 1) is the (n  1)-dimensional vector whose components all equal x^. We dene the
set behaviorally distinct types from f as
Df =

g 2 F : arg max
x2X
g
 
x; x^(n 1)
 \ arg max
x2X
f
 
x; x^(n 1)

= ? for all x^ 2 Xf

: (2)
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In words: in a group where everybody else plays some x^ 2 Xf , an individual of type g never
chooses a strategy that could have been rationally chosen by an individual of type f .
In real-life populations, there is typically a variety of traits present in a population at
any point in time. Moreover, the distribution of traits tends to change over time. While
some models in the literature are dynamic and allow for multiple types that are simultane-
ously present in the population, most of the analyses are static and presume that at most
two types are simultaneously present. Such analyses often rest on a simple but powerful
thought experiment that builds on and extends the notion of evolutionary stability, initially
introduced by Maynard Smith and Price (1973).
2.1 Strategy evolution
Classic evolutionary stability analysis considers symmetric and nite two-player games under
the hypotheses that (A) the population is innitely large (modelled as a continuum), (B)
matching is uniformly random, and (C) each individual is programmed to play some pure or
mixed strategy. The thought experiment behind the denition of evolutionary stability is the
following, here generalized to an arbitrary group size n. Suppose that initially there is some
strategy, say x, that is used by everyone in the population. This is the resident strategy.
Suddenly, another strategy, say y, appears in the population. This is the mutant strategy.
The question is then whether the mutants, who sometimes meet each other and sometimes
the residents, earn a higher or lower average material payo¤ than the residents. Let " 2 (0; 1)
be the population share of mutants. The type distribution  is then binary, with  (x) = 1 "
and  (y) = ". Assumptions (A) and (B) together imply that the probability that a given
resident is matched with precisely m mutants (for m = 0; 1; :::; n  1) is binomial,
pm (") =

n  1
m

 (1  ")n m 1  "m; (3)
and that this is also the probability, qm ("), that a given mutant is matched with m other
mutants. Hence, the average material payo¤s to a resident and to a mutant are, respectively,(
R (x; y; ") =
Pn 1
m=0 pm (")  
 
x;
 
x(n m 1);y(m)

M (x; y; ") =
Pn 1
m=0 qm (")  
 
y;
 
x(n m 1);y(m)
 ; (4)
where x(k) is the k-dimensional strategy vector whose components all equal x, y(k) is the
k-dimensional vector whose components all equal y, and m stands for the total number
of mutants in the group, and qm (") = pm ("). Note that R (x; y; ") and M (x; y; ") are
continuous in ".
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The resident strategy is evolutionarily stable (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973) if there
for every mutant strategy y 6= x exists "y > 0 such that
R (x; y; ") > M (x; y; ") 8" 2 (0; "y) : (5)
Evolutionary stability may be conveniently characterized as follows. Let  (x; y; ") =
R (x; y; ")   M (x; y; "). This payo¤ di¤erence (sometimes called the score function)
is di¤erentiable in ", and the inequality in (5) holds if and only if either (i)  (x; y; 0) > 0,
or (ii)  (x; y; 0) = 0 and @ (x; y; ") =@"j"=0 > 0. We also note that a necessary condition
for x to be evolutionarily stable is that

 
x;x(n 1)
    y;x(n 1) 8y 2 X: (6)
In other words, if a strategy x is evolutionarily stable, then x has to be a symmetric Nash-
equilibrium strategy of the game in which all players have payo¤ function . A population in
which an evolutionarily stable strategy is played is thus behaviorally indistinguishable from
a population consisting of Homo oeconomicus individuals who freely choose their strategy
in order to maximize their own material payo¤.
2.2 Preference evolution
The thought experiment underlying the denition of evolutionary stability of preferences
is similar. Suppose, thus, that there is some utility function, say f 2 F , that at some
point in history is used by everyone in the population. This is the resident utility function.
Suddenly, another utility function, say g 2 F , appears in the population. This is the mutant
utility function. The question is, again, whether the mutants, when rare, earn a higher or
lower average material payo¤ than the residents. However, types are now dened in terms
of preferences, and individuals are assumed to optimally adapt their choice of strategy to
the situation at hand. The literature on preference evolution has stayed close to standard
economic theory by requiring that the two typesaverage material payo¤s should be evaluated
when population play is in equilibrium (in terms of individualspreferences). More precisely,
focus is typically on type homogenous (Bayesian) Nash equilibria, in which all individuals
of the same type use the same strategy. This does not presume that populations always
play such equilibria. The requirement is that if the population happens to be in some such
equilibrium, at least then it should not be possible for mutants to invadethe population.1
1A usual interpretation (see e.g. Sandholm, 2001) in the literature is that behavioral adaptation occurs on
a faster time-scale than preference adaptation. The stability condition then is that if behavioral adaptation
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Let (f; g; ") be the population state in which the two types f and g are represented in
population shares 1  " and ", respectively. Of particular interest will be population states
in which " is positive but small, i.e., when the mutant type g is rare. Such population
states amount to binary type distributions in which  (f) = 1   " and  (g) = " for " > 0
small. For any given population state (f; g; "), random matching process, and information
setting (complete or incomplete information), let  (f; g; ")  R2 be the associated set of
average equilibrium material-payo¤pairs (R; M) 2 R2. In other words, for each (M ; R) 2
 (f; g; "), R is the average material payo¤ accruing to residents and M is the average
material payo¤ accruing to mutants, in some type homogenous (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium.
We are now in a position to formalize generalized notions of evolutionary stability and
instability in the spirit of Maynard Smith and Price (1973). Let   F . A type f 2 
is evolutionarily stable against a type g 2  if there is an " > 0 such that R > M for
all (R; M) 2  (f; g; ") and all " 2 (0; "). A type f 2  is evolutionarily stable in 
if it is evolutionarily stable against all g 2  \ ( [f ]). A type f 2  is evolutionarily
unstable if there is a type g 2  and an " > 0 such that for every " 2 (0; ") there is some
(R; M) 2  (f; g; ") with M > R.
The requirement for stability is stringent, since it requires the residents to strictly ma-
terially outperform mutants in all Nash equilibria. By contrast, for a preference type to
be unstable it is su¢ cient that there exists one mutant type that earns a higher material
payo¤ in one Nash equilibrium, whenever the mutant is su¢ ciently rare. We nally note
that, because we require strict outperformance, there are in general utility functions that
are neither stable nor unstable.2
With this model in hand, we can proceed to identifying conditions under which Homo
oeconomicus prevails and thereafter conditions under which Homo oeconomicus does not
prevail.
leads towards a Nash equilibrium (in terms of preferences), then it should not be the case that mutants fare
materially better in that equilibrium.
2We note that this denition of evolutionary stability encompasses also strategy evolution by way of
letting   F be the subset of utility functions f for which some strategy x^ 2 X is strictly dominant (for
example f (xi;x i)   kxi   x^k).
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3 Settings in which Homo oeconomicus prevails
3.1 Decision problems
The above setting includes decision problems, that is, material-payo¤ games in which each
players material payo¤depends only on his or her own strategy. Formally,   = hn;X; i is a
decision problem if there exists a continuous function v : X ! R such that  (x;y) = v (x) for
all x 2 X and y 2 Xn 1. In decision problems, Homo oeconomicus is evidently evolutionarily
stable against all behaviorally distinct types. Moreover, any type f 2 F that is behaviorally
distinct from Homo oeconomicus is unstable. In sum:
Observation 1: In decision problems, Homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily stable
against all behaviorally distinct types, and the latter types are evolutionarily
unstable.
It should be noted, however, that we here assume that individuals perceive the situation
(strategy set and material payo¤s) without errors. When such perception errors exist, pref-
erences other than Homo oeconomicus may be stable (see, e.g., Rayo and Becker, 2007, and
Robson and Samuelson, 2011). The literature on preference evolution that we are concerned
with here is not about decision problems, so we now turn to strategic interactions.
3.2 Continuum population, uniform random matching and incom-
plete information
Assume that (A) the population is a continuum, (B) player matching is uniformly random,
(C) the type set is a subset of the set of all continuous utility functions,   F , and (D)
each individuals type is his private information. The set of type-homogenous Bayesian Nash
Equilibria (BNE) in a population state (f; g; "), is then the set of strategy pairs (x^; y^) 2 X2
that satisfy (
x^ 2 arg maxx2X
Pn 1
m=0 pm (")  f
 
x;
 
x^(n m 1)

; y^(m))

y^ 2 arg maxy2X
Pn 1
m=0 qm (")  g
 
y;
 
x^(n m 1); y^(m)
 : (7)
In order to investigate whether f 2  is evolutionarily stable against g 2 , one has
to evaluate the material payo¤s in all solutions (x^; y^) 2 X2 to this system of xed-point
conditions for all small " > 0. This may seem a daunting task, since residents may well
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vary their equilibrium behavior radically when the population share of mutants changes
even slightly. For example, the resident type may play a mixed-strategy equilibrium when
no other type is around, that is, when " = 0, but switch to a pure strategy when " turns
positive. Two approaches have been adopted in the literature to deal with this issue.
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) analyze nite and symmetric two-player material games.
They focus on utility functions f : X2 ! R of the bilinear form f(x; y) = Pk;h2S xkukhyh
for some numbers uhk. This denes their type space  as a nite-dimensional subspace G
of F , those utility functions that meet the expected-utility hypothesis for mixed strategies.
Evidently, one may identify each utility function f 2 G with its associated subjective payo¤
matrix u = (uhk), and refer to this matrix as its type.3 Let  :  ! X denote a rule
that to every type  assigns some mixed strategy. Their stability concept di¤ers slightly
from the one given above, and applies to any type distribution  with nite support on
 = G. They call such a type distribution  stable if there exists a rule  which is a best
response to itself given the type distribution , and such that the pair (; ) constitutes
what they call a stable conguration. The denition of a stable conguration is somewhat
technical but essentially requires (i) that all resident types those in the support of 
earn the same average material payo¤ under , and (ii) that a small population share "
of mutants cannot destabilize the conguration. Destabilization occurs either if a mutant
type materially outperforms the resident types, or if a mutant type induces the residents to
switch behavior far from that prescribed by . The authors show that when interactions
take place under incomplete information, then for a distribution  to be stable all residents
must play some strategy x^ 2 X, that is, behave as Homo oeconomicus does in symmetric
equilibrium in the absence of mutants. They also show that if (x^; x^) is a strict equilibrium
in the material-payo¤ game for some strategy x^ 2 X, then play of x^ is compatible with a
stable conguration. In sum, for two-player nite (linear) games:
Observation 2: Under uniform random matching in a continuum population,
and unobservable preference types, conguration stability implies symmetric
Nash-equilibrium play in the material-payo¤ game, and symmetric strict equilib-
rium play in the material-payo¤ game is conguration stable.
In Alger andWeibull (2013, 2016) we establish su¢ cient conditions forHomo oeconomicus
3For any number m 2 N of pure strategies, let U = Rm2 . Then each u 2 U denes an mm payo¤matrix
where the entries are the row-players payo¤s, and this denes a utility function fu in the m2-dimensional
subspace G of F , where fu(x; y) =
P
k;h2S xkukhyh 8x; y 2  (S).
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to be the evolutionary viable in a di¤erent model. We consider all continuous and aggregative
material games, for which the material payo¤ function  need not be multi-linear. In those
studies, we took the type space to be the whole set of continuous and aggregative utility
functions,  = F . Utility functions being continuous, the equilibrium correspondence, which
maps the mutant share " to the set of solutions to (7), is then upper hemi-continuous.
This means that for small but positive mutant shares " > 0 each equilibrium is within a
neighborhood of some resident equilibrium x^ 2 Xf . Since also the material payo¤ function
is continuous, this in turn implies that to check whether f is evolutionarily stable against
g, it is su¢ cient to evaluate the average material payo¤s R and M in the limit as " ! 0.
In other words, it is su¢ cient to evaluate 
 
x^; x^(n 1)

and 
 
y^; x^(n 1)

for each pair (x^; y^)
which satises (7) in the limit as "! 0, i.e.,(
x^ 2 arg maxx2X f
 
x; x^(n 1)

y^ 2 arg maxy2X g
 
y; x^(n 1)

:
(8)
Suppose that the resident type is Homo oeconomicus, f = . Then, since
x^ 2 arg max
x2X

 
x; x^(n 1)

(9)
for all x^ 2 Xf , there evidently exists no behaviorally distinct mutant type g whose best
response y^ would satisfy 
 
y^; x^(n 1)

> 
 
x^; x^(n 1)

. In other words, Homo oeconomicus
is evolutionarily stable against all types g 2 D. Conversely, if f is behaviorally distinct
from Homo oeconomicus, i.e., if f 2 D, then there does exist some mutant type whose best
response y^ is such that 
 
y^; x^(n 1)

> 
 
x^; x^(n 1)

. In other words, every type f 2 D is
evolutionarily unstable. In sum:
Observation 3: Under uniform random matching in a continuum population,
and unobservable preference types, Homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily stable
against all behaviorally distinct types, and such types are evolutionarily unstable.
3.3 A coordination game
To illustrate the above stability concepts, consider a resident population of Homo oeconomi-
cus playing the symmetric 2 2 coordination game with material payo¤ bimatrix (the rst
number in each entry being the material payo¤ of the row player):
a b
a 2; 2 0; 0
b 0; 0 1; 1
(10)
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For f = , the set of residential equilibrium strategies is Xf = f0; 1=3; 1g. Consider a
mutant type who is committedto pure strategy a with, say, utility function g (x; y) = 4xy+
(1  x) (1  y), where x; y 2 [0; 1] is own (respectively, the opponents) probability of playing
pure strategy a.4 In a sense, this is the most threatening mutant to Homo oeconomicus, since
g is not behaviorally distinct from f , and, moreover, it always plays according to the best
strict equilibrium in terms of material payo¤s. The equilibrium condition (7) for the resident
Homo oeconomicus under incomplete information, when the mutants are in population share
", is
x^ 2 arg max
x2[0;1]
2 [(1  ") x^+ "]x+ (1  ") (1  x^) (1  x) : (11)
There are three equilibria in population states (f; g; ") where " is positive and small. Mutants
play a in all of them, while the residents play a in one of them, b in another one, and the
mixed strategy x^ (") = (1  3") = (3  3") in the third one. Is Homo oeconomicus, f = ,
evolutionarily stable against g? The answer is negative. The reason is that the mutant g
earns exactly the same material payo¤ as f in one of the Nash equilibria in population states
(f; g; ") with " small, since f = g = 2 when x^ = y^ = 1. A fortiori, Homo oeconomicus is
not evolutionary stable in this example. However, Homo oeconomicus is not evolutionarily
unstable either, since for any mutant type g 6= , there exists an " > 0 such that x = 1 is
an equilibrium strategy for Homo oeconomicus in all population states (f; g; ") with " < ".
Nonetheless, in force of the general observation above, Homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily
stable against all mutants g 2 D (and this can be easily veried directly in this example).
We conclude this example by noting that the above-mentioned result by Dekel, Ely and
Yilankaya (2007) tells us that in every stable conguration the residents use a strategy in
the set Xf = f0; 1=3; 1g, that there are stable congurations in which they play x = 0, and
stable congurations in which they play x = 1 (since these are strict equilibria).
4 Settings where Homo oeconomicus is outperformed
The results summarized above identied the following set of assumptions as being su¢ cient
for Homo oeconomicus to be evolutionarily stable: individuals interact under incomplete
information, individuals are uniformly randomly matched together to interact, and the pop-
ulation is a continuum. Are these conditions also necessary for Homo oeconomicus to be
4We note that g 2 G, with payo¤ matrix (uhk) with uaa = 4 and otherwise uhk = hk.
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evolutionarily stable? To investigate this question we lift each assumption in turn.
4.1 Complete information
We here study settings where interactions take place under complete information, but keep
the assumptions of continuum population and uniform randommatching. Homo oeconomicus
is then evolutionarily unstable. A simple example illustrates why. Suppose that Homo oeco-
nomicus is the resident type and that the material game is a two-player prisoners dilemma,
c d
c 2; 2 0; 4
d 4; 0 1; 1
(12)
Consider a mutant type g (x; y) = 7xy + 4 (1  x) y + (1  x) (1  y), where x; y 2 [0; 1]
is own (respectively, the opponents) probability of cooperating (playing pure strategy c).5
Under complete information, the unique Nash equilibrium in a game between two residents,
and in a game between a mutant and a resident, is for both players to defect (play d). By
contrast, in a game between two mutants there are three Nash equilibria: x = 1, x = 1=4,
and x = 0. In other words, these preferences allow mutants to cooperate with each other
and defect against residents. In any post-entry population in which the mutants play the
equilibrium x = 1 (or x = 1=4) this mutant type strictly outperforms Homo oeconomicus,
since its average material payo¤ is then 2 " (respectively, (23  7") =16) while that of Homo
oeconomicus is 1. Hence, Homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily unstable.6
Which preferences are stable then, when individuals in a continuum population are uni-
formly randomly matched to interact under complete information? The literature shows
that the answer depends on the set  of feasible preferences, and on the material game at
hand.
5Again, note that g 2 G, this time with payo¤ matrix (uhk) with uaa = 7 and otherwise uhk = hk.
6Under strategy evolution in this material game, mutants whose strategy consists, by way of a secret
handshake, in playing c against each other, and d against residents, strictly outperform residents who always
play d (Robson, 1990).
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4.1.1 Finite two-player games
Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007) (see Section 3.2 for a description of their setup) call a
strategy x 2 X e¢ cient if  (x; x)   (y; y) for all y 2 X. They show that under complete
information e¢ cient strategies are the only candidates for conguration stability, and that if
an e¢ cient strategy is also its own unique best reply (in terms of material payo¤s), then it is
conguration stable. In particular, while the e¢ cient strategy prole (a; a) in coordination
game (10) is conguration stable, the strategy prole (b; b) is not, and while the e¢ cient
prole (c; c) in the prisonersdilemma (12) is conguration stable, (d; d) is not. The intuition
is clear. As shown in the above prisonersdilemma, the instability of an ine¢ cient strategy
is due to the existence of mutants who may behave like residents when they meet residents
and do better when meeting each other. However, if a strategy is e¢ cient, and, moreover,
is its own unique best reply, then the mutants cannot achieve higher payo¤ when meeting
neither residents nor each other.7 In sum:
Observation 4: Under uniform random matching in a continuum population,
and complete information in nite and symmetric two-player material-payo¤
games, (material) e¢ ciency is necessary for conguration stability, and e¢ ciency
and strict equilibrium (both in material payo¤s) are together su¢ cient for con-
guration stability.
So far, we have seen how mutants can successfully invade a resident population by be-
having di¤erently towards each other than towards residents, while, at the same time, the
residentsbehavior was unchanged. However, mutants may sometimes successfully enter a
population by instead making residents alter their behavior. To see this, suppose that the
material game is a hawk-dove game, with material payo¤s
h d
h  1; 1 4; 0
d 0; 4 2; 2
(13)
Let x 2 [0; 1] denote the probability that an individual plays h, and y 2 [0; 1] the probability
that his opponent does so. Suppose that Homo oeconomicus is the resident type. In a
homogenous population, the unique Nash equilibrium in any matched pair is x = 2=3. This
7See Ockenfels (1993) for an early analysis of preference evolution in the prisoners dilemma game.
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mixed strategy is e¢ cient. Consider now a mutant type, appearing in population share
", with a utility function gh 2 G for which pure strategy h is strictly dominant.8 Whether
matched with another mutant or with a resident, such a mutant always plays pure strategy h.
Under complete information, residents play x = 2=3 when matched with another resident,
but switch to playing d with certainty when matched with a mutant. For small " > 0, mutants
then garner a higher material payo¤, 4 (1  ")   ", than residents, who obtain 2 (1  ") =3.
Hence, although necessary, e¢ ciency is not su¢ cient for stability, an observation in line with
Proposition 3 in Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007).
The residential adaptation we saw in this example suggests that maybe there are stable
type distributions (in the sense of Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya, 2007) with more than one type
present? Can the two types mentioned above coexist in such population shares that their
average material payo¤s are equalized, and will this be stable? Indeed, this possibility was
pointed out in Banerjee and Weibull (1995). By way of studying populations in which every
individual is either a Homo oeconomicus or else committed to one particular pure strategy,
they showed that a pure Homo oeconomicus population is evolutionarily unstable if the
material-payo¤ game has at least one bullystrategy, a pure strategy that earns a higher
payo¤against each of its best replies than they earn against it. An example is pure strategy h
in the above hawk-dove game. The best reply to h is d, and in such a meeting h earns 4 while
d earns zero. Banerjee and Weibull (1995) showed that a certain binary type distribution,
with both Homo oeconomicus and hawkspresent, is evolutionarily stable when the type
space  consists of hawks, represented by a utility function gh 2 G as above, doves
gd 2 G likewise dened, and Homo oeconomicus, . In the present example, let the type
distribution assign probability  to type h and probability 1  to Homo oeconomicus. The
latter will then play d when matched with a hawk and x = 2=3 when matched with
another Homo oeconomicus. Hence, the average material payo¤ to a hawkis 4 (1  ) ,
and the average material payo¤ to a Homo oeconomicus is 2 (1  ) =3. The two types earn
exactly as much if and only if  = 10=13. The resulting population behavior, however, is
the same as in the unique Nash equilibrium of the material payo¤ game. These observations
hold qualitatively in all Hawk-Dove games. Combining the results of Banerjee and Weibull
(1995) with those of Dekel, Ely and Yilankaya (2007), we obtain:
Observation 5: Under complete information in nite and symmetric material-
payo¤games with a bully strategy, conguration stability may require that Homo
8For example, let the payo¤ matrix (uhk) have uhh = 1 and otherwise uhk = hk.
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oeconomicus coexists with a bully type in xed positive population shares.
In other words: natural selection under complete information may select for a population
mix of rational and aggressive individuals. This is due to the, since ancient times, well-
known power of commitment (see Schelling, 1960). The commitment power obtained by
having preferences that are known by others has also been central to the bulk of the early
contributions to the literature on indirect evolution, to which we now turn.
4.1.2 Two-player games with continuum of pure strategies
In Bester and Güth (1998) the pure-strategy set X is taken to be R+, the non-negative reals,
and the material payo¤ function to be of the non-linear form
 (x; y) = (b  x)x+ cxy; (14)
for some b > 0 and c 2 ( 1; 1). For c positive (negative), the game exhibits positive
(negative) externalities; a higher action by a player increases (decreases) the material payo¤
to the other player. The authors restrict preferences to a one-dimensional subset of F , by
assuming that each individual has a utility function f of the form
f (x; y) =    (x; y) + (1  )   (y; x) ; (15)
for some   1=2. The type set  is thus the subset of utility functions f 2 F for some
  1=2. For  < 1, such an individual attaches a positive weight to the other players
material payo¤, and is thus altruistic (Becker, 1976). By contrast, for  > 1, the individual
attaches a negative weight to the other players material payo¤ and is thus spiteful. Homo
oeconomicus is the intermediate knife-edge case when  = 1. We will call   1=2 the types
degree of altruism/spite.
In a match between individuals of arbitrary degrees of altruism/spite ;  2  there is
a unique Nash equilibrium (x^ (; ) ; x^ ( ; )) 2 X2, and thus a unique pair of equilibrium
material payo¤s. Bester and Güth (1998) ask which type  2 , if any is evolutionarily
stable. This amounts to searching for some value   1=2 such that if u is the resident
utility function and u the mutant utility function, for some  6= , the uniquely dened
average equilibrium material payo¤ to a resident, R, exceeds that to a mutant, M , for all
su¢ ciently small mutant shares " > 0:
(1  ")   [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] + "   [x^ (; ) ; x^ ( ; )] (16)
> (1  ")   [x^ ( ; ) ; x^ (; )] + "  [x^ ( ; ) ; x^ ( ; )] :
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Both sides being continuous in ", a su¢ cient condition for type  to be evolutionarily stable
against type  is  [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] >  [x^ ( ; ) ; x^ (; )], while a necessary condition is
 [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )]   [x^ ( ; ) ; x^ (; )]. Noting that, for a given , the right-hand side of
these inequalities may be viewed as a function of  , we see that a necessary condition for
type  to be evolutionarily stable is that  be a solution to the xed-point equation
 2 arg max
1=2
 [x^ ( ; ) ; x^ (; )] : (17)
In the present model, where for a given ,  is di¤erentiable in  , this allows the analyst
to conveniently identify candidates for evolutionarily stable utility functions by solving the
necessary rst-order condition for (17) to hold (with subscripts for partial derivatives):
1 (x^ ( ; ) ; x^ (; ))  x^1 ( ; )j= =   2 (x^ ( ; ) ; x^ (; ))  x^2 (; )j= : (18)
The two sides of this equation measure, for any given resident parameter value , the two
e¤ects of mutating towards a marginally di¤erent parameter value,  , when the mutation is
vanishingly rare. The left-hand side measures the e¤ect on the mutants own equilibrium
strategy and the associated e¤ect on the material payo¤. The right-hand side measures
the strategic-commitment e¤ect: the mutation causes the opponent (which almost for sure
is a resident) to change his equilibrium strategy and this in turn also a¤ects the mutants
material payo¤.
With the material payo¤ function used by Bester and Güth (1998) and given in (14), one
obtains  = 1  c=2 as the unique solution to (18). By way of considering the second-order
condition it is easily veried that this -value is indeed evolutionarily stable.
Three qualitatively distinct cases arise. First, when c = 0, individuals, even if matched
into pairs, e¤ectively face a decision problem. Not surprisingly, Homo oeconomicus then
prevails:  = 1. Second, if c > 0, the strategies are strategic complements in the material
payo¤ function . Then,  < 1, which means altruism. The reason is that although such
altruism makes an individual contribute more than Homo oeconomicus would, which is costly
in material terms, this makes also the opponent contribute more, and the net material e¤ect is
benecial. It is important to notice that the reason for whyHomo oeconomicus is displaced by
altruists is not that altruists obtain a benet from interacting with each other. Instead, under
complete information altruists may enter a population of Homo oeconomicus, by making the
latter behave di¤erently than they do when meeting another Homo oeconomicus. Under
uniform random matching (as we here assume), an altruistic mutant in a population of
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resident Homo oeconomicus has virtually no chance of being matched with another altruistic
mutant.
Third, if c < 0, spite obtains;  > 1. This is because when strategies are strategic
substitutes, an individual with spiteful preferences contributes less than Homo oeconomicus
would, and this in turn makes a Homo oeconomicus contribute more when matched with a
spiteful individual than with another Homo oeconomicus.
The astute reader will have noticed that Bester and Güth (1998) in fact reported the
value  = 1 for the evolutionarily stable value of  in the case c < 0. This is because
they restricted the set of potential values of  to the interval [1=2; 1]. Bolle (2000) and
Possajennikov (2000) contributed by pointing this out, and Possajennikov (2000) derived
the evolutionarily stable preferences for the case c < 0. Using preferences of the slightly
di¤erent parametric form
f (x; y) =  (x; y) +    (y; x) ; (19)
for  2 R, he reports a stable value  = c=2 which is equivalent to the result reported above
(since = (1  ) = c=2). He further lifts the restriction c 2 ( 1; 1) imposed by Bester and
and Güth (1998), and shows that there exists an evolutionarily stable value of , namely,
 = c=2, if and only if c 2 [ 2; 1] [ (2;+1).
Remark 1 If for each possible matched pair there exists a unique Nash equilibrium, the
average equilibrium material payo¤ to a resident and to a mutant is linear in the share
of mutants " (recall (16)). Hence, it is possible to recast the model as a standard two-
player evolutionary game, in which the preference traits are strategies, the set  of potential
preference traits  is the set of strategies, and the payo¤ function is ^ : 2 ! R, where for
each pair (; ) 2 2, ^ (; ) is dened as  [x^ (; ) ; x^ ( ; )]. In this evolutionary game, a
strategy 2  is evolutionarily stable against strategy 2  if either ^ (; ) > ^ ( ; ),
or ^ (; ) = ^ ( ; ) and ^ (; ) > ^ ( ; ), just as in Maynard Smith and Price (1973).
Indeed, this is the approach adopted by Bester and Güth (1998), with  = [1=2; 1]
A more general model, which encompasses the ones discussed above as special cases, was
analyzed by Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007a,b). They consider a general class of two-
player strategic interactions that need not be symmetric. In order to facilitate comparison
with other models in this survey, we focus on the symmetric special case of their model, and
when the strategy set X is a subset of R. The material payo¤ function  : X2 ! R is taken
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to be thrice continuously di¤erentiable. They consider utility functions of the form
f (x; y) =  (x; y) + v (x; y; ) ; (20)
where the function v (also taken to be trice di¤erentiable) represents what the authors call
the individuals disposition. The parameter  is taken to be a real number that belongs to
some interval D  R containing a neighborhood of 0, and v (x; y; 0) = 0 for all strategy pairs
(x; y). Hence,  represents the intensity of the disposition, with  = 0 corresponding to Homo
oeconomicus. Bester and Güths (1998) model (for  is thrice continuously di¤erentiable)
is the special case when v (x; y; ) =    (y; x) for  = (1  ) = (and Possajennikov
(2000) corresponds to v (x; y; ) =    (y; x) for  = ). Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel
(2007a,b) proceed by analyzing evolutionary drift in the intensity parameter  for any given
disposition function v. Such an evolutionary analysis thus takes the type space  to be the
unidimensional manifold Fv  F consisting of all functions f of the form (20) for some
 2 D, where Homo oeconomicus is represented by f0.
Using the same notation as above, for any disposition v, and any type pair f; f 2 Fv,
let (x^ (; ) ; x^ ( ; )) denote a Nash equilibrium strategy in a pair in which the types are 
and  . Equilibrium uniqueness and di¤erentiability is imposed as an assumption in Heifetz,
Shannon, and Spiegel (2007a).9
Given their assumptions, the (total) derivative d [x^ ( ; ) ; x^ (; )] =d , evaluated at  =
 measures the net e¤ect on a individuals (equilibrium) material payo¤ from a marginal
change of his type, away from the resident type . Recall from the description of Bester
and Güth (1998) that, in a model where the population is a continuum, this derivative also
measures the net payo¤ e¤ect of mutating, at the margin, away from the resident type,
evaluated in the limit as the population share of mutants tends to zero. If this marginal
e¤ect is strictly positive (negative), it would thus pay o¤ to mutate towards a higher (lower)
value in the type space. Hence, a necessary condition for a type  to be evolutionarily stable
is that d [x^ ( ; ) ; x^ (; )] =d = 0 when evaluated at  = . In a population consisting of
Homo oeconomicus, i.e., with residents of type  = 0, this total derivative equals
1 [x^ (0; 0) ; x^ (0; 0)]  x^1 (0; 0) + 2 [x^ (0; 0) ; x^ (0; 0)]  x^2 (0; 0) : (21)
The rst term is the e¤ect that the marginal mutation has on the mutants equilibrium
material payo¤ due to the ensuing change in own strategy. The second term is the e¤ect
9In their companion paper (2007b), they instead assume a selection from the Nash equilibrium correspon-
dence that is continuously di¤erentiable at the origin in their type space.
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that the marginal mutation has on the mutants equilibrium material payo¤ due to the
ensuing change in the opponents strategy. The rst term must be nil, because in this
setting the rst-order condition 1 (x^; x^) = 0 must hold for any x^ 2 X. Hence, whenever
there is a strategic commitment e¤ect of preferences, in the sense that x^2 (0; 0) 6= 0, and the
individuals material payo¤ is a¤ected by this (i.e., 2 (x^; x^) > 0), then Homo oeconomicus
is evolutionarily unstable.10 In sum:
Observation 6: Under complete information, for almost all two-player material-
payo¤ games and for almost any disposition (such as altruism or spite), Homo
oeconomicus is unstable, and instead some non-zero intensity of the disposition
will be stable.
Analyzing the stability of preferences within the class of altruistic preferences of the form
(19), in Alger and Weibull (2012) we further derived a result which establishes a link between
the strategic nature of the material payo¤ game and the nature of stable preferences. We
considered any continuously di¤erentiable material payo¤ function  : X2 ! R such that
2 6= 0 and such that for any degrees of altruism ;  2 ( 1; 1) there exists a unique interior
and di¤erentiable pair of Nash equilibrium strategies, (x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )). Using the rst-
order condition for (x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )) to be an interior Nash equilibrium strategy, namely,
1 [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] =   2 [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] ; (22)
the necessary condition for a degree of altruism  2 ( 1; 1) to be evolutionarily stable (see
(21)) can be written
  x^1 (; ) =  x^2 (; ) . (23)
Call the strategies strategically neutral if 12 (x; y) = 0 for all strategies x and y, strategic
substitutes if 12 (x; y) < 0 for all strategies x and y, and strategic complements if 12 (x; y) >
0 for all strategies x and y. Then (Alger and Weibull, 2012):
Observation 7: Under uniform random matching in a continuum population
with observable preference types, Homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily stable if
strategies are strategically neutral (in terms of material payo¤s), and unstable if
strategies are either strategic complements or strategic substitutes. In the case of
10For evolutionary stability, they use asymptotic stability in payo¤-positive selection dynamics.
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strategic complements, altruism emerges, while spite emerges in the case strategic
substitutes.
The key point here is that under complete information the specics of the material game
matter for stable preferences. In our evolutionary past, especially in pre-industrial times,
the material game may in turn have depended on the environment. To see this, suppose that
the material game represents food production in a community. Compare two populations,
one in which hunted big game constitutes the main food source, and one in which gathered
insects, roots and berries are the main food source. Now, hunting big game typically requires
teamwork in which e¤orts are strategic complements, while e¤orts in food gathering are
strategically neutral or strategic substitutes (they are strategic substitutes, for instance, if
food is scarce and the distance an individual has to cover to nd food to gather depends
on the e¤orts spent by others in the community on food gathering). The results reported
above suggest that evolution by natural selection can sustain a higher degree of altruism in
the rst population than in the second.
4.1.3 A parallel with contract theory
While models in the literature on preference evolution are typically not cast as descriptions
of market interactions, it is clear that strategic commitment may be valuable in markets. For
instance, in duopolistic markets under Cournot competition, it can pay o¤ to be aggressive
by somehow committing to producing a quantity exceeding the Cournot-Nash equilibrium
quantity. This is the point made by Fershtman and Judd (1987). We describe their model
here in order to highlight the di¤erences and similarities with preference evolution models.
Consider a duopolistic market in which a rm who produces the quantity x when the
competitor produces the quantity y garners prot
 (x; y) = (b  x  y)x  cx; (24)
for some b > c  0. If the goal of each rm is to maximize its prot, the unique Nash
equilibrium quantity is x^ = (b  c) =3, and each rms prot is  (x^; x^) = (b  c)2 =9. Suppose
now instead that one rm still seeks to maximize its prot (say, its manager has a contract
with a prot bonus), while the other seeks to maximize a weighted sum of prot and sales
(say, its manager has a bonus scheme based on both prot and sales)
f (x; y) =   [(b  x  y)x  cx] + (1  )  (b  x  y)x: (25)
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If the weight  is smaller than one, it is as if the rms cost was below c. As a result, the
rm will then produce more than if it simply sought to maximize prot. In response to this,
the competitor, who is assumed to know the goal function f, will produce less. It is easy
to verify that the rm whose (managers) goal function is f obtains a higher equilibrium
prot than the rm whose (managers) goal function is its prot, .
Based on this observation, Fershtman and Judd (1987) study a two-stage interaction
between the two rms to determine which goal function should be expected to emerge as the
result of competition between them. In the rst stage, the owners of the rms simultaneously
choose a weight each in R, a weight to be attached to the prot in the convex combination
described in (25). Let  and  denote the chosen values. In the second stage, the rm
managers simultaneously choose a quantity each to be produced, based on the goal functions
chosen by their respective owners in the rst stage. Anticipating the equilibrium quantities
x^ (; ) and x^ (; ), where
x^ (; ) =
b  c
3
+
c (1 +   2)
3
; (26)
the owner who picks  anticipates the prot  (; )   (x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )), while the owner
who picks  anticipates the prot  (; )   (x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )). Hence, it is as if the two
owners played a simultaneous-move symmetric game in which the strategies are  and , the
common strategy set is R, and the payo¤ function is  : R2 ! R. The unique symmetric
equilibrium of this game is
 = 1  b  c
5c
: (27)
In sum, in a duopolistic market in which each rm manager chooses the quantity to be
produced, a rm owner should not be expected to request his manager to maximize prot.
Instead, if each owner chooses to provide incentives to his managers so that she maximizes
a function of the form given in (25), then the rm owners best respond to each other by
setting  = . In other words, a positive weight is given to sales, and a weight below 1 is
given to prot (note that the weight given to prot can even be negative!). This apparently
counter-intuitive result apparently hinges on the assumption of complete information about
contracts, enabling contracts to act as commitments.
While Fershtman and Judd (1987) do not explicitly model the process by which rms
initially appear and perhaps eventually go bankrupt, their result shows that it is necessary to
interpret with care Milton Friedmans (1953) claim that unless the behavior of businessmen
in some way or other approximated behavior consistent with the maximization of returns,
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it seems unlikely that they would remain in business for long: managers of successful rms
may not necessarily seek to maximize prots.
4.2 Assortative random matching
Until now we have only examined settings with uniform random matching, i.e., in which
the type distribution that an individual faces in the matching process is independent of his
own type. It is hard to think of real societies where uniform random matching would occur.
Indeed, natural populations are typically structured into (geographic, cultural, linguistic or
socioeconomic) groups, and interactions tend to occur preferentially, though not exclusively,
within these groups, for reasons including transportation costs and homophily. This in turn
implies that carriers of a rare mutant trait tend to relatively often interact with each other,
perhaps even unbeknownst to them. For example, suppose that preferences are genetically
transmitted, and suppose that in an initially homogenous population suddenly a new pref-
erence type appears in one individual. In the second generation some interactions between
carriers of the new trait may occur between siblings and in the third among cousins.
A strand of the evolutionary literature investigates the consequences of such assortative
matching on the stability of preference types. The evolution of genetically transmitted traits
in structured populations, giving rise to assortativity, was initially formalized in the island
model (Wright, 1931). And although some work on preference evolution uses the island
model (Rogers, 1994, Akçay and van Cleve, 2012, Alger, Weibull, and Lehmann, 2018), in
economics assortativity has mostly been modeled as an abstract function that maps the
distribution of traits in the population to probabilities governing the matching of interacting
individuals. This formalization of assortativity, pioneered by Bergstrom (1995, 2003), is
outlined below for n-player interactions (following Alger and Weibull, 2016).11
In any population state s = (f; g; ") 2 2 (0; 1), the number of mutants individuals of
type g in a group that is about to play the material-payo¤ game, is a random variable, T .
For any resident drawn at random from the population let pm(") be the probability that the
number of mutants in the residents group is m, for m = 0; 1; ::; n   1.12 Likewise, for any
mutant, also drawn at random from the population, let qm(") be the conditional probability
11For a more general formalization of assortative matching rules, with results for strategy evolution, see
Jensen and Rigos (2018).
12In the special case of uniform random matching, pm (") is as dened in (3).
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that the number of other mutants in his or her group is m = 0; ::; n   1. Let p(") =
(p0("); :::; pn 1(")) and q(") = (q0("); :::; qn 1(")) be the so dened probability distributions.
We will say that the random matching is uniform if p(") = q("), and assortative if p(") 6=
q(").
The literature has examined models in which both p(") and q(") are continuous in the
mutant population share, " 2 (0; 1), and converge to some limit points p and q, respectively,
as "! 0. These limit points turn out to play a key role in the analysis of stable preferences in
a continuum population. In a continuum population, residents virtually never meet mutants
when the latter are vanishingly rare, so p = (1; 0; 0; :::; 0). Turning now to the limit vector
q, which we call the assortativity prole of the matching process, note rst that in the
special case of uniform random matching, the matching probabilities for mutants are the
same as for residents, so then q = p. Under assortative matching, it is useful to study
the di¤erence between the probability Pr[f jf; "] for an individual of the resident type f that
another, uniformly randomly sampled member of his group also has the resident type, and
the probability Pr[f jg; "] of this event for an individual of the mutant type g:
(") = Pr[f jf; "]  Pr[f jg; "]:
This denes the assortment function  : (0; 1) ! [ 1; 1] (the same for all type pairs).
Suppose that this function is continuous and that it has a limit value, , as the mutant share
tends to zero, to be called the index of assortativity of the matching process (Bergstrom,
2003). Since lim"!0 Pr[f jf; "] = 1, it is immediate that q = (1  ; ) in the special
case of pairwise interactions (n = 2). For interactions in larger groups there remains a
statistical issue, namely whether or not the types of other members of a mutants group are
statistically dependent of each other or not. An important special case is when a mutants
other group memberstypes are conditionally independent of each other. This case arises,
for example, in groups of siblings when each childs type is an independent random draw
from the parentstypes, or in groups of students from the same school, when each students
type is independently drawn from the teacherstypes. Then q is binomial:
qm =

n  1
m

m (1  )n 1 m for m = 0; 1; :::; n  1. (28)
We now ask whether assortativity a¤ects the stability of preferences, and if so, how.
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4.2.1 Incomplete information
In our studies of preference evolution under incomplete information and assortative matching
(Alger and Weibull, 2013, 2016), we let the type space be the full set F of continuous and
aggregative utility functions. We found that a specic kind of utility function, hitherto
unstudied in economics, stands out. We called this class of utility functions Homo moralis.
An individual is a Homo moralis with morality prole  2  if his or her goal function
f 2 F is of the form
f (x;y) = E [ (x;Y )] 8 (x;y) 2 Xn; (29)
where Y is a random strategy vector in Xn 1 such that with probability m exactly m 2
f0; :::; n  1g of the n 1 components of the vector y are replaced by x, with equal probability
for each subset of size m, while the remaining components of y keep their original values.
Homo moralis preferences have a Kantian avor: for any given strategy prole, an in-
dividual with such preferences evaluates her or his strategy choice in the light of what the
material payo¤ would be, should some or all other individuals also choose that strategy. At
one extreme of the spectrum of Homo moralis we nd Homo kantientis, the variety that has
morality prole  = (0; :::; 0; 1), in which case E [ (x;Y )] =  (x; x; :::; x). Individuals of this
pure Kantiantype always choose a strategy that, if hypothetically adopted by everyone
in the group, would maximize all group membersmaterial payo¤s. At the opposite extreme
we nd Homo oeconomicus, a Homo moralis with morality prole  = (1; 0; :::; 0), in which
case E [ (x;Y )] =  (x;y). The behavior of all other varieties of Homo moralis lies between
these two extremes. Homo moralis with morality prole  2  behaves as if she followed a
probabilistic version of Kants categorical imperative (Kant, 1785); she evaluates the strate-
gies at her disposal in the light of what would happen in the hypothetical scenario in which
others would probabilistically use her strategy, according to the probability distribution .13
While the function in (29) may be mathematically fairly involved, it is particularly simple
if one assumes  = Bin (n  1; ), for some  2 [0; 1]. The utility is then the individuals ex-
pected material payo¤ if, hypothetically, each other player would statistically independently
switch to his strategy with probability . In this one-dimensional case,  can be referred
to as the individuals degree of morality. This is particularly clear for pairwise interactions
13It should be noted that, for nite games, the utility of an individual with Homo moralis preferences
is typically non-linear in own mixed strategy. Such preferences do not belong to the set of preferences G
considered by Dekel, Ely, and Yilankaya (2007).
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(Alger and Weibull, 2013):
f (x; y) = (1  )   (x; y) +    (x; x) : (30)
Alger and Weibull (2013, 2016) establish:
Observation 8: Under assortative random matching in a continuum population,
and unobservable preference types, Homo moralis with the assortativity prole
of the matching process as its morality prole is evolutionarily stable against all
behaviorally distinct types, and the latter are evolutionarily unstable.
In other words, evolutionary stability favors Homo moralis preferences of a morality
prole that precisely reects the assortativity of the matching process, i.e.,  = q. In
particular, under conditional independence (see (28)), Homo moralis with degree of morality
 =  is evolutionarily stable.
The intuition for the result is that in a population that consists almost solely of Homo
moralis with the rightmorality prole, these individuals preempt entry by rare mutants by
using some strategy that would maximize the average material payo¤ to a vanishingly rare
mutant who would enter this population.14 To see this, note that by the same (topological)
arguments as those used for the special case of uniform random matching (see Observation 3
and the discussion preceding it), it is su¢ cient to evaluate the average equilibrium material
payo¤s R and M for each (x^; y^) satisfying(
x^ 2 arg maxx2X f
 
x; x^(n 1)

y^ 2 arg maxy2X
Pn 1
m=0 q

m  g
 
y; x^(n 1 m); y^(m)

;
(31)
i.e., the system of equations dening (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium in the limit case when
" ! 0 (note that (7) holds for any p("); q(")). Importantly, the result does not rely on
individuals seeking to behave in a way which materially benets the group to which they
belong; instead, it is driven by individual utility maximizing behavior, and the material
payo¤ benet that such utility maximization bestows on the individual.
We note that in the special case of two-player constant-sum games, the preferences of
Homo moralis with any degree of morality  < 1 are identical with those of Homo oe-
conomicus; the rst utility function is but a positive a¢ ne transformation of the second
14See also Alger and Weibull (2013) and Robson and Szentes (2014) for a similar observation.
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(u (x; y) = a (x; y) + b for a > 0 and b 2 R). Such Homo moralis are thus behaviorally
identical to Homo oeconomicus. Not surprisingly, Homo oeconomicus prevails in all decision
problems, just as under uniform random matching (see Section 3). Indeed, in decision prob-
lems material payo¤s are una¤ected of what others do, and hence, Homo moralis preferences
are represented by E [ (x;Y )] = E [v (x)] = v (x), for all strategies x and random strategy
proles Y , irrespective of the morality prole. In sum:
Observation 9: Under assortative random matching in a continuum population,
with unobservable preference types, Homo oeconomicus is behaviorally identical
with every Homo moralis except for Homo kantientis, in all decision problems,
and in all two-player constant-sum games.
Prior to turning to preference evolution under complete information, we briey discuss a
seminal contribution for strategy evolution.
4.2.2 Strategy evolution
In his paper, Bergstrom (1995) focuses on pairwise interactions, and he studies the stability
of genetically determined strategies in interactions between siblings. He shows how the nec-
essary condition for a strategy to be evolutionarily stable depends on whether reproduction
is asexual or sexual, and in the latter case, on whether the preference trait is autosomal dom-
inant or recessive. Under asexual reproduction, individuals are clones of their single parent,
and hence, siblings always have the same preferences. Hence,  = 1, any evolutionarily
stable strategy must also be a Nash equilibrium in a game where the payo¤ to each player is
f for  =  = 1. Under sexual reproduction and an autosomal dominant preference trait, in
the limit as the mutant share " tends to zero, the probability that a sibling of an individual
with a mutant strategy is 1/2, while that probability equals zero for an individual with the
resident strategy. Hence,  = 1=2, and any evolutionarily stable strategy is what Bergstrom
(1995) calls semi-Kantian, i.e., it must be a Nash equilibrium in a game where the payo¤ to
each player is f for  =  = 1=2. By contrast, under sexual reproduction and an autosomal
recessive preference trait, an evolutionarily stable strategy must be a Nash equilibrium in
a game where the payo¤ to each player involves a mix of selsh, Kantian, and altruistic
motives, as follows:
w (x; y) =
3
5
  (x; y) + 1
5
  (x; x) + 1
5
  (y; x) : (32)
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A key insight generated by these results is that the transmission process itself matters for
which strategies may be evolutionarily stable.15 This is related to the huge literature in
evolutionary biology on the evolution of traits when genetically related individuals interact
(Hamilton, 1964, Grafen, 1979, Hines and Maynard Smith, 1979, Rousset, 2004).
4.2.3 Complete information
Returning to preference evolution under assortative matching, models with pairwise interac-
tions under complete information were examined by Alger and Weibull (2010, 2012). Both
models focused on the class of altruistic preferences, see (19), and on interactions with a
unique and di¤erentiable Nash equilibrium for each pair of preference types (; ) 2 ( 1; 1)2.
Hence, the degree of altruism  is evolutionarily stable if for all  6= , there exists " such
that for all " 2 (0; "), the average equilibrium material payo¤ to a resident exceeds that to
a mutant:
Pr [j; "]   [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] + Pr [j; "]   [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] (33)
> Pr [j; "]   [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] + Pr [j; "]   [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] :
Given that the conditional probability functions are continuous (by assumption), it is su¢ -
cient to examine this inequality in the limit as " tends to zero, i.e.:
 [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] > (1  )   [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] +    [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )] : (34)
Noting that the two sides of this inequality are equal when  = , the following rst-order
condition is necessary for  2 ( 1; 1) to be evolutionarily stable:
(1  )  @ [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )]
@
+   d [x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )]
d

=
= 0. (35)
Using the rst-order condition for (x^ (; ) ; x^ (; )) to be an interior Nash equilibrium
strategy pair (recall (22)), this equation is equivalent to
(   )  x^1 (; ) + (1  )  x^2 (; ) = 0. (36)
This generalizes the equation (23) from uniform random matching to assortative matching,
and it is then straightforward to show:
15For an early analysis by economists of evolutionarily stable strategies in the prisoners dilemma in the
presence of assortative matching, see also Bowles and Gintis (1998).
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Observation 10: In a continuum population, under assortative matching and
observable preferences, evolutionary stability within the class of altruistic prefer-
ences requires the degree of altruism to equal the index of assortativity if strate-
gies are strategically neutral (in terms of material payo¤s), to exceed the index of
assortativity if strategies are strategic complements, and be lower than the index
of assortativity if strategies are strategic substitutes.
By contrast to settings with uniform random matching (see Observation 7), then, here
a positive degree of altruism may be stable even when strategies are strategic substitutes.
Like under uniform random matching, however, the stable degree of altruism depends on the
nature of the material game.
Arguably, such dependence on the material game can be explored to investigate how
preferences depend on the environment in which the population evolves, in so far as this
environment a¤ects material payo¤s. In Alger and Weibull (2010) we examine in detail
a material game which may well have been relevant in our evolutionary past: grown-up
siblings exert e¤ort towards production, whose outcome is uncertain, and, upon observing
each others output each sibling may choose to share some of its output with the other.
Properties of the associated evolutionarily stable degree of sibling altruism are derived, and
numerical simulations show how it depends on the harshness of the environment, such as the
costs of and probabilistic returns to e¤ort. We found that the stable degree of altruism is lower
in harsher environments. This result may appear counter-intuitive since risk-sharing has a
larger survival value in harsh environments. The result is explained by the fact that altruists
are more vulnerable to exploitation by less altruistic siblings in harsher environments. In
harsh environments, individuals work harder, so a rare mutant who is slightly less altruistic
than the residents is almost certain to be helped by his sibling if his output is low.16
4.3 Finite populations
Until now we have focused on innitely large populations, which, admittedly, is an unrealistic
assumption. Accordingly, a strand of the literature has modeled preference evolution in nite
populations. The key implication is that, even absent any assortativity in the matching
process, the distribution of types that an individual faces in its matches depends on his own
16See Alger and Weibull (2008) for a discussion of these results in light of evidence on the strength of
family ties in di¤erent parts of Europe in pre-industrial times.
29
type. We begin by illustrating this point with a mini ultimatum bargaining game, analyzed
by Huck and Oechssler (1996), and then turn to the main contribution by Ok and Vega-
Redondo (2001). Prior to doing this, however, we note that the denition of evolutionary
stability can still be applied, by letting the share " of mutants be the number of mutants
divided by total population size.
Individuals in a nite population of nite sizeN (whereN is even), are randomly matched
into pairs to play two rounds of the mini ultimatum bargaining game, once in the proposer
role and once in the responder role; individuals cannot observe each others type, and the
authors further assume that individuals do not condition play in the second round on the
play in the rst round. When in the responder role, an individual either accepts or rejects
the proposers o¤er. If she accepts, the proposers o¤er is implemented; otherwise, they both
get material payo¤ of 0. When in the proposer role, a player can choose between the fair
split of the endowment, which is set to 2, or an egoistic split, which, if accepted, would give
2   to him and  2 (0; 1) to the responder. Huck and Oechssler (1996) assume that there
are two types of players. Type A is Homo oeconomicus, while Type B gets subjective utility
 2 (; 1) from rejecting an unfair o¤er. Interactions occur under incomplete information.
Anticipating that Type A individuals accept all o¤ers, while Type B individuals accept only
fair o¤ers, it is optimal for an individual to o¤er the egoistic split only if he expects to meet
a Type B with a su¢ ciently low probability. Suppose that Type A is the resident type, and
that one mutant of Type B appears in the population. For some parameter values, both the
residents and the mutant then o¤er the egoistic split. This results in B > A if the benet
of always getting 2    in the proposer role net of the material cost of turning down the
egoistic o¤er, is greater than the benet of getting 2  in the proposer role with probability
(N   2) = (N   1) only, which is the case for residents.17
Ok and Vega-Redondo (2001) propose a more general model of preference evolution in
n-player interactions in nite populations, both under complete and incomplete information.
Their goal is to establish results on the stability properties of Homo oeconomicus preferences,
and they conne their analysis to population states in which there is at least one individual
of the mutant type present. Under complete information they generalize the argument illus-
trated by the hawk-dove game above by showing that in any game where it would pay o¤
materially to be a Stackelberg leader, Homo oeconomicus is materially outperformed by a
type who is committed to playing the strategy that a Stackelberg leader would play against a
17A similar e¤ect was noted by Scha¤er (1988) in a model of strategy evolution.
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follower with Homo oeconomicus preferences. In a match between a Homo oeconomicus and
this committed type, the latter materially outperforms the former. Hence, if the committed
type is a rare mutant in a population with Homo oeconomicus as residents, the mutants
materially outperform residents (even if they perform worse than residents when matched
with each other).18 Under incomplete information, for settings in which the material payo¤
function is continuous and strictly concave, and utility functions are in the set F , they show
that while Homo oeconomicus may be unstable when the population is small, there exists a
population size above which Homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily stable against behaviorally
distinct types. This shows that the corresponding result derived under incomplete informa-
tion uniform random matching in a continuum population (see Observation 3) is robust with
respect to population size.
In sum:
Observation 11: In nite populations, in a large class of settings under incom-
plete information Homo oeconomicus is evolutionarily stable if and only if the
population is large enough.
5 Discussion
We conclude by discussing a number of issues that we feel should receive more attention by
researchers in this eld.
5.1 The preference type space
The results reported above indicate that predictions regarding the evolutionary viability
of preferences evidently depend on assumptions regarding the set of potential preferences.
In this respect the literature has so far focused on two main approaches. One consists in
minimally restricting the set of potential preferences, while the other one restricts attention
to a certain parametric class of preferences. In both cases, the domain of preferences is the
18Koçkesen, Ok and Sethi (2000a,b) make a similar point with a mutant utility function which consists
in maximizing own material payo¤ relative to that of the opponent(s). They do not, however, conduct an
evolutionary analysis.
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set of strategy proles in the material game. Going forward, we see several avenues for future
research on this issue.
First, while the literature which restricts attention to a certain parametric class of prefer-
ences has tended to focus on altruistic preferences (Becker, 1976), the behavioral economics
literature has proposed a menu of parametric classes of preferences. Thus, the evolutionary
foundations of warm glow (Andreoni, 1990), inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999),
social responsibility (Brekke, Kverndokk, and Nyborg, 2003), or lying costs (Kartik, 2009),
among others, remain to be examined.
Second, there is no particular reason for why the domain of preferences should be re-
stricted to the set of strategy proles in the material game. In view of the behavioral
economics literature, two alternative hypotheses seem promising. First, an individuals pref-
erences may depend on the preferences of his opponent. An example of such preferences is
reciprocal altruism (Levine, 1998), whereby the weight that an individual attaches to his op-
ponents material payo¤depends on some underlying altruism parameter and the underlying
altruism parameter of his opponent. Sethi and Somanathan (2001) adopt a similar prefer-
ence specication and identify the evolutionary viability of reciprocal altruists compared to
Homo oeconomicus. But one can imagine many other such preferences. Second, people may
have a desire to conform (Bernheim, 1994), a sense of identity (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000),
or image concerns (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006). Although some work has been conducted
on the evolutionary foundations of social mindedness (Fershtman and Weiss, 1998), more
general analyses are called for.
Third, the commonly adopted approach in the economics literature on preference evo-
lution is to interpret the material payo¤ as tness.19 This assumption merits closer exam-
ination. Indeed, although it is not outlandish to assume that tness (loosely speaking, the
number of surviving o¤spring if the preference trait is genetically determined, and the num-
ber of cultural o¤springif the preference trait is acquired through cultural transmission)
is monotonic in some material payo¤ (calories, wealth, physical or mental achievements, cool
factor, etc.), it is not clear whether the preferences predicted in models where the mater-
ial payo¤ is interpreted as tness in fact apply at the material-payo¤ or at the tness level.
This question is key for researchers who want to test the theoretical predictions. Since tness
19A notable exception is Robson (1996), who analyzes the evolutionary foundations of von Neumann-
Morgenstern utility functions over material payo¤s, when these payo¤s determine the number of children.
Attention is restricted to decision problems, however.
32
is a complex notion, which evolutionary biologists have modeled for decades, collaboration
between economists and evolutionary biologists on this issue may be fruitful. Some such
interdisciplinary e¤orts have been made in recent years; see Day and Taylor (1998), Akçay
et al. (2009), Akçay and van Cleve (2012), Lehmann, Alger, and Weibull (2015), and Alger,
Weibull, and Lehmann (2018).
5.2 Observability of preferences
The theory summarized above indicates that the observability of preferences matters signif-
icantly for the qualitative nature of stable preferences. First, observability enables mutants
to benet materially either by coordinating on e¢ cient play, or by making residents adopt
a di¤erent behavior towards them than towards other residents. Second, under complete
information evolutionarily stable preferences typically depend on the material game, i.e.,
on the environment in which the population evolves. While the literature has delivered a
rich set of results in the two extreme scenarios of complete and incomplete information, less
is known about intermediate scenarios. Heifetz, Shannon, and Spiegel (2007a) consider a
scenario in which an exogenously given share of matches interact under complete informa-
tion, while the remaining share interact under incomplete information. Heifetz, Shannon,
and Spiegel (2007b), as well as Frank (1987), analyze a model in which matched individuals
each receives a noisy signal of the opponents preference parameter. Dekel, Ely, and Yi-
lankaya (2007) study the robustness of their results to the assumption that each individual
observes his opponents preferences with some probability p 2 (0; 1) (independent of what
the opponent observes). Many other intermediate scenarios can be imagined.
The ability of individuals to correctly perceive the preferences of those with whom they
interact cannot be dissociated from the issue of mimicry, however. If it pays o¤ materially
to be perceived as being of a certain type, would it then not pay o¤ even more to appear
to be of this type and in fact maximize own material payo¤? Deception is commonplace in
the animal and the vegetal kingdom (and other kingdoms of life). There is thus reason to
believe that it should also be present in our species. On the other hand, it has often been
argued that emotions, such as irrepressible anger, or physical states, such as blushing, are
honest signals of preferences (Frank, 1987, 1988, Hirshleifer, 2001). In view of the results
reported above, that in some settings the exible Homo oeconomicus, who materially best
responds to (its perception of) the social environment can coexist with committed types, it
would be interesting to examine heterogeneous population states, with both mimickers and
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non-mimickers. Such theoretical investigations should seek to determine, in general settings,
conditions which enable such heterogeneous population states to be stable, or prevent them
from being so. For recent contributions in this direction, see Mohlin (2012) and Hopkins
(2014).
Relatedly, in almost all models individuals do not select their interaction partners. Lift-
ing this assumption is certainly important; for some contributions in this direction, see
McNamara et al. (2008) and Izquierdo, Izquierdo, and Vega-Redondo (2010).
5.3 Individualsenvironment
The literature on preference evolution in strategic interactions focuses almost exclusively
on populations which evolve in a given and xed environment, represented in the models
by the material payo¤ function, the strategy set, the population size, and the matching
process. Hence, no assumptions are needed regarding the ability of individuals to perceive
changes in the environment, and a fortiori regarding their ability to respond to such changes.
Intuitively, a changing environment should favor exible utility maximizers over committed
types. However, intuition alone cannot guide our understanding of whether a changing
environment should tilt the balance in favor of Homo oeconomicus or other preferences.
This is an important agenda for future research.
Another important issue is that the environment itself may partly be a product of prefer-
ences. For instance, in a hunter-gather population the marginal cost of gathering food may
depend on gathering behaviors of past generations, which in turn may have depended on the
time preferences of individuals in these past generations. In spite of the importance of such
interdependence between humans and the environment in which they evolve, this topic has
hitherto not been received much attention (see, however, Sethi and Somanathan, 1996).
Relatedly, institutions the humanly devised constraints that structure political, eco-
nomic and social interactions(North, 1991) are also endogenous. Through their impact
on the set of available actions and the associated material payo¤s, institutions may be ex-
pected to a¤ect preferences. Hence, it is likely that preferences and institutions coevolve, a
phenomenon which is not well understood (for recent contributions, see Belloc and Bowles,
2017, and Wu, 2017). In particular, economists are in a good position to develop models
that analyze whether and how the market economy has a¤ected the prevalence of certain
preferences and traits in humans (Saint-Paul, 2007).
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More generally, in view of the importance of markets in the modern world, and of the
literature on preference evolution, we would like to highlight the possibility that the tra-
ditional stance in economics which consists in treating preferences as primitives may give
rise to policy recommendations which fail to achieve long-term goals. Indeed, this would
be the case if the implementation of such recommendations led to changes in preference
distributions which would deteriorate the situation in the long run.
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